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Broadening the scope of this discussion to reflect on the wider issues of financing football clubs.
When people talk about football finance, the conversation usually jumps straight to the Premier League however, the real financial stress in English football is much easier to see further down the pyramid. In League One, League Two and the National League, where revenue is smaller, owner support is more critical, and one bad season can create genuine solvency problems. The House of Commons Library noted in 2025 that despite rising revenues across English football, clubs overall remained heavily loss-making, with aggregate losses of £1.2bn in 2022/23, over £3bn across three seasons, and around 85% of clubs loss-making, with losses accelerating faster in the lower leagues.
That is the key point: lower-league football does not mainly suffer from a lack of ambition; it suffers from a lack of margin for error. A Premier League club can post a large accounting loss and still survive because of broadcasting income, global commercial revenue and access to capital. A League One, League Two or National League club often does not have that cushion. It is far more dependent on gate receipts, local sponsorship, cup runs, player sales and continuing owner backing.
The published accounts of clubs outside the top flight make that pressure obvious. Wrexham’s official results for the year ended 30 June 2024 showed record turnover of £26.725m, but still a loss of £2.729m; the club itself made clear that this was after substantial strategic investment and with unusually strong commercial growth for a club that had only recently been in the National League. Carlisle United’s published 2024/25 summary showed turnover falling from £8.3m to £6.6m, while football costs rose to £5.4m and player wages increased by £1m. Even with resilient attendances and higher commercial income, the margin is clearly tight. These are not reckless outliers; they are examples of how easy it is for costs to outrun normal football income outside the elite.
What makes the lower leagues especially fragile is that many clubs are not really operating on self-generated cash. They are operating on owner commitment plus hope. Hope of promotion. Hope of a cup run. Hope of a transfer fee. Hope that the owner keeps writing cheques. That model can work for a while, but it is not robust governance. The fan-led review and the government’s response were both clear that too many clubs have historically been run on unsustainable assumptions, leaving them exposed when results turn, investors pull back, or debts need refinancing.
The National League is especially important here because it has become a kind of financial pressure chamber for former EFL clubs. It is full of clubs with Football League infrastructure, Football League supporter expectations and, in some cases, Football League cost habits, but without Football League central distributions. The National League’s own rules require clubs to submit full annual financial statements and disclose loan arrangements, which tells you that financial monitoring in that division is not a side issue; it is central to the competition’s stability.
That gap between expectation and income is, in my view, one of the biggest threats facing football over the next few years.
The first likely issue is continued overspending for promotion. In League One and League Two, the financial reward for moving up remains so significant that clubs will keep stretching wages and transfer budgets beyond what recurring income really supports. In the National League, promotion remains even more valuable because it is the gateway back to EFL distributions, higher visibility and, often, better sponsorship terms. That means clubs will keep taking risks even when the balance sheet says caution.
The second issue is greater dependence on wealthy owners and soft loans. Wrexham are the high-profile example of owner-backed growth done with momentum and commercial upside, but most clubs do not have that level of brand expansion or investor profile. For a typical lower-league or National League club, owner funding is not growth capital; it is often working capital. If that support weakens, the club can run into difficulty very quickly.
Third, I think we will see more pressure around infrastructure and stadium funding. Clubs are rightly trying to improve grounds, training facilities and fan experience because matchday and commercial revenue matter more outside the Premier League. But infrastructure spending needs cash, and clubs lower down the pyramid usually do not have spare cash. So the same clubs being told to modernise are often the clubs least able to fund that modernisation without external backing. Carlisle’s own accounts summary explicitly framed infrastructure improvements as part of long-term growth, but that long-term logic still has to survive the short-term cash reality.
Fourth, regulation is going to get tougher, and some clubs will struggle with that. The Football Governance Act 2025 created the Independent Football Regulator with a purpose of protecting and promoting the sustainability of English football, and the government’s fact sheet says the regime is intended to improve financial resilience across the pyramid by reviewing plans and stepping in where concerns exist. That should be a good thing for supporters, but it will be uncomfortable for clubs that have relied on weak forecasting, opaque funding structures or last-minute rescue money.
Fifth, the gap between the very strongest and weakest clubs in the lower leagues may widen. Some clubs will build stable models around attendances, community support, disciplined wages, better commercial operations and realistic planning. Others will continue to chase short-term sporting success with cost bases that only make sense if everything goes right. In the next downturn, whether that is relegation, lower attendances, reduced owner appetite or a bad run without player sale profits, those football clubs with weaker models will be exposed.
So the real financial warning sign in English football is not just that clubs lose money. It is that, lower down the pyramid, too many clubs are still one shock away from serious distress. The Premier League’s problems are about control, regulation and competitive balance. The lower leagues’ problems are more basic: cash flow, dependency, sustainability and survival. And unless governance improves materially, I think the coming years will bring more emergency funding, more distress sales, more supporter anxiety, and more examples of historic clubs living far too close to the edge.
